Decision making by participants in supply chains is fundamentally constrained in online and offline (O2O) supply chain management. Enterprises ultimately seek selling strategies that can increase their sustainability in highly competitive marketplaces. In making purchase decisions, customers like to ''touch and feel'' products, and providing this experience to customers must be considered when calculating the costs for retailers of customers returning products. Therefore, in this study, we discuss the influence of selling strategies and the retailer cost of handling returns according to different distribution channels. The O2O supply chain decision models under a duopoly and monopoly are constructed to obtain the wholesale price and selling price, as well as the maximum profits of game players. One important result is that when the retailer's cost of handling returns is within a certain range, the profits of the supplier and O2O supply chain in the duopoly context (Model D) are higher than those in the monopoly context (Model O). However, regardless of the retailer cost of handling returns, an e-retailer's profits are always higher than the sum of the two retailers' profits. For consumer surplus, when the retailer's cost of handling returns meets certain conditions, the consumer surplus is lower in the monopoly context (Model O) than in the duopoly context (Model D) and creates more utility for consumers in a duopolistic market. The research is beneficial for companies seeking to establish sound pricing and sales strategies in the emerging field of O2O commerce, enhancing companies' long-term economic performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing popularity of e-commerce, consumers are now familiar with buying goods and services through the Internet. It has become a widespread practice to sell products both online and offline. In today's big data era, online to offline (O2O) selling is highly valued and is being adopted as part of the long-term growth strategies of many e-businesses [1] . Several traditional enterprises and e-commerce companies have invested in O2O, which is making competition among e-commerce platforms increasingly fierce. According to iResearch consulting data, China's e-commerce transactions reached $4.2 trillion in 2018, which represents a year-on-year growth of 17.8%. China's online shopping market accounted for 62% of the total retail market. Online marketing and purchasing drive offline consumption The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Hao Luo . and business, combining offline business opportunities with the Internet and placing the Internet at the forefront of offline transactions. In response, the O2O business model integrates the online virtual economy (virtual world) and the offline real economy (real world). Thus, more enterprises are transitioning from traditional modes to the O2O mode, integrating online and offline resources to achieve dualchannel operation. Examples include Alibaba Corporation, Wal-Mart, Uber, Woolworths, GoodRx, IKEA, Getaround, Zaarly, J Hilburn/Trunk Club, and Airbnb. In the era of the virtual economy, e-businesses are expanding their business through offline and online channels.
Under these circumstances, an increasing number of enterprises are combining traditional and online resources to improve economic performance. It is therefore imperative to find more effective ways to deliver online orders to consumers, which will ultimately increase pressure on the supply chain and affect profit margins. Recently, OrderDynamics' omni-1000 report found that only 29% of retailers in the United States provide online purchase and offline pick-up services. There is no doubt that retailers understand the enormous value of O2O channels, but stores' ability to serve customers' needs must be improved. Zhang et al. [2] studied the degree of customer loyalty in a supply chain. They showed manufacturers to be expanding the sales volume of their offline channels by operating online channels, thereby gaining greater market share. On the other hand, traditional retailers still play a key role: They provide an ideal physical shopping experience, after-sales service, and product maintenance services, which satisfy the growing consumer demand for diversification and personalization.
Retailers must consider the impact of product returns on business performance. Product returns can force retailers to improve product quality. Online shopping does not allow customers to ''touch and feel'' products, which does not match well with the current preferences of customers. Therefore, offering customer returns has become commonplace, resulting in reduced consumer utility [3] . In fact, the value of products returned by global consumers after purchase totals $642.6 billion annually. According to IHL, a market research firm, consumers in the US have the highest percentage of returns, with $221.7 billion worth of products returned annually. Looking at the online environment, when the Taobao shopping platform launched its ''double eleven'' global shopping carnival, the return rate was estimated to be as high as 20%. On the other hand, physical stores can ensure that consumers find products matching their desires by improving the offline experience service levels, training salespeople to help consumers inspect products and reduce the probability of product mismatch [4] . Thus, although the merchant has limited ability to handle product returns online, it can provide appropriate service levels in a physical store. In reality, product quality problems or damage can also lead to product returns. Consumers can inspect the product in a physical store and then decide whether to buy it either in a physical store or online. In sum, the cost of high returns affects both consumers' buying behavior and retailers' actions.
Since participants in the supply chain follow the rules of economic maximization, manufacturers and traditional retailers pursue their own profit maximization schemes, which reduces the entire supply chain efficiency, making channel conflict inevitable [5] . The rapid development of third-party logistics (for instance, Federal Express, DHL Express, United Parcel Service, TNT Express) has led manufacturers to reconsider whether to cooperate with intermediaries (we refer here to retailers) or with end customers or to use both approaches in parallel. This will inevitably lead to competition with downstream intermediaries for customers, greatly dampening the enthusiasm of downstream intermediaries. In addition, when the capacity of downstream intermediaries is strengthened, they are unwilling to accept their current status and seek to gain more rights in the channel system, striving for greater market share, which will intensify conflict.
Many enterprises can effectively alleviate channel conflicts by establishing channel distribution systems. The introduction of a revenue-sharing mechanism helps coordinate a closed-loop supply chain, and the sharing ratio significantly affects sales prices and wholesale prices [6] - [8] . Tsay and Agrawal [9] studied the influence of channel conflict on distribution strategy. They divided sales strategies into direct sales, reseller-only and both channels, as well as incentive schemes' influence on game players. The schemes achieved a division of labor due to channel advantage. In the coming era of big data, e-business enterprises can further improve their long-term sustainability performances when using O2O channels. Uniqlo, a well-known clothing brand from Japan, has a model in which all stores are directly operated and online and physical stores are integrated with online and offline bidirectional drainage. This structure allows online ordering with pick-up from physical stores, which improves the shopping experience of consumers and drives offline customer flow. This approach effectively handles the logistics problem and forms a closed-loop O2O system.
Although there is a large body of literature on pricing and marketing strategies, most of the research does not consider the impact of product returns. Furthermore, only a small part of the literature considers product returns from a single channel, and there is no O2O e-commerce background. For e-retailers, the hidden costs of product mismatch cannot be ignored and directly affect business performance. Sahoo et al. [10] reviewed the impact of online product reviews on returns. In an empirical analysis of consumers' shopping behaviors, they found customers buy substitutes to mitigate the uncertainty when product reviews are not easily available. Ullrich and Transchel [11] discussed the relationship between demand-supply mismatches (DSM) and stock returns and provided empirical evidence but did not take into account the impact of product returns. DSM causes lower sales growth and profitability.
Given the existing research, this paper uses the theory and methods of cross-discipline optimization, such as the theory of demand cross elasticity, to analyze equilibrium price, selling strategy, channel selection, and supply chain profits. It establishes a decision-making game model of the O2O supply chain. Specifically, the following fundamental research issues are addressed.
(1) Enterprises can sell commodities through offline physical stores and virtual online stores, and this will become a development trend for future retail industries. How do different channels affect the strategic behavior of competing retailers? How do prices change when an e-retailer operates an online store in addition to a brick-and-mortar store?
(2) In reality, product returns resulting from defects are a common phenomenon. How do the return costs affect the profits in the duopoly and monopoly contexts? What is the equilibrium game result of multichannel pricing and different decision-making behaviors for the entire O2O supply chain?
(3) In market competition, the supplier and e-retailer inevitably compete with each other to maximize their profits. VOLUME 7, 2019 However, it is important to know how pricing decisions and channel strategies should be made within an O2O business model.
To address these issues, we construct a game model for analysis in the duopoly and monopoly contexts. This article makes three contributions to the current understanding of selling concepts in a sustainable marketing strategy. First, our work primarily aims to compensate for the gap in the literature by concentrating on an analytical framework in an O2O model considering the supply chain, which includes a supplier, an e-retailer and consumers. It focuses on examining the influence of different channels on optimal pricing decisions and performances from the perspective of supply chain management. Second, from an economic sustainability perspective, as one might expect, the monopolist operating online and offline channels always makes more profits than the duopoly. The profits of the supplier are subject to different circumstances. From a social point of view, consumer surplus measures the extra benefits that buyers feel they have gained. Under the condition of voluntary transaction, consumers can improve their own situations by choosing the optimal amount of consumption. Finally, the results from analytical modeling provide several managerial insights that are beneficial for game players in developing reasonable pricing strategies and provide a theoretical basis for the decision making of O2O supply chain participants. This also facilitates coordination and cooperation to improve the financial performance of both parties. The theoretical model is illustrated in Figure 1 . The article is organized as follows: Section II provides an outline of related work, and Section III presents the research framework. We then focus on pricing decisions and marketing strategies for an O2O supply chain in Sections IV and V. In Section VI, decisions in monopoly and duopoly scenarios are discussed. Numerical analysis is provided in Section VII. Finally, in Section VIII, conclusions and ideas for further research are given. The appendix provides the proofs.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, O2O supply chains in the duopoly and monopoly contexts have rarely been studied, which represents a gap in the theory. In particular, under the O2O business model, it is worth exploring market demand, pricing decisions, marketing modes and supply chain profits. There is also little existing research on the online and offline selling problem. In practice, the importance of marketing strategies and pricing of O2O supply chains has been recognized (Lu and Liu [12] ). Under the O2O business model, the selection of the right environment for an enterprise ecosystem is more complicated. Different stakeholders in a supply chain establish cooperative mechanisms to improve decision-making efficiency, e-commerce and retailing and form a symbiotic rather than a zero-sum relationship, forming a win-win cooperative ecological circle. The following two basic research streams were found in the literature:
A. PRICING DECISIONS AND CHANNEL SELECTION
The literature on pricing decisions and channel selection has produced some insights, and, indeed, many interesting results have been obtained. Whether or not suppliers and platform vendors offer online and offline sales is an important decision in multiproduct pricing. Hanson and Martin [13] , similar to Zhang and Yue [14] , showed that the pricing of a single firm represented new economic insights and effectiveness. They formulated an optimization model to improve a firm's profits. Yan and Pei [15] focused on a direct channel using online technology to enhance market competitiveness. Hua et al. [16] considered delivery lead time and pricing through an online direct channel. Dan et al. [17] examined optimal pricing for retail services using a Stackelberg game (Chintagunta et al. [18] ). Quantifying costs were investigated when purchasing groceries from online to offline. Hu and Li [19] investigated price decisions and service levels with a dual channel. A key theoretical model of service levels was developed in a competitive context. Ryanet al. [20] studied a manufacturer who sells a single commodity through a dual channel. Balakrishnan et al. [21] analyzed the influence of O2O pricing strategies under value uncertainty. Consumers first visit a physical store to browse the goods and then decide whether to purchase them in the store or online at a cheaper price. This behavior is known as ''showrooming''. Jiang et al. [22] proposed the use of an instant coupon and an appropriate bundle discount to increase revenue. Given customers' purchase preference, they designed a model to handle the online pricing issue. Bundling and coupons are appropriate tools for integrated marketing. Gao and Su [23] studied online payment and offline physical store pick-up. They built a stylized model with offline and online channels given a customer's channel choice. Recently, Ji et al. [24] focused on the low-carbon environment of the O2O retail supply chain. Mehra et al. [25] showed that customers often select a ''bestfit'' product in a physical store but purchase it online at a cheaper retail price. They considered two types of retailers -online and brick-and-mortar stores -and analyzed the issue of price matching. Xie et al. [6] explored the influence of advertising investment and revenue. In particular, wholesale prices and optimal offline/online prices were obtained. Heet al. [26] examined how quality impacts consumer purchase behavior in the O2O environment. They formulated an O2O business model concerning the quality effect. Yao and Liu [27] discussed pricing strategies for both offline and online distribution channels and designed the retail and etail prices, respectively. Chen et al. [28] analyzed pricing policies for suppliers and retailers. The retailer sells goods through O2O channels. Given the dominance, the wholesale price is first formulated, and the substitute product's retail price is decided by the retailer. Then, an appropriate cooperation strategy is formulated using the Nash equilibrium. Wang et al. [29] discussed pricing and channel sales with O2O channels under different scenarios. Luoet al. [30] investigated optimal pricing policies under different power structures, considering both vertical and horizontal competition. Luo et al. [31] looked at how customer value affects pricing decisions and found that the pie split is determined by the power structure. Cao et al. [32] examined the impacts of consumers moving from online to offline stores concerning demand distribution and profitability. In the context of the tourism industry, where online travel agencies collaborate through online sales and offline services, Long and Shi [33] analyzed and compared optimal pricing and revenue strategies using the Stackelberg and Bertrand games and provided some meaningful suggestions. Jing [34] analyzed the degree of competition between e-retailers and traditional retailers in the context of information externality, where consumers are open to purchasing unknown products.
B. PRODUCT RETURNS-RELATED DECISION PROBLEMS
Other literature considered product returns-related decision problems in supply chains but only in a single-channel scenario. Anderson et al. [3] found that the option to return leads to additional costs so that there must be a balance between demand and the cost of different return policies. Shulmanet al. [35] discussed optimal return policies by considering a restocking fee and providing product fit information. They found that the provision of information could hurt retailer profits due to consumer uncertainty. Shulman et al. [36] looked at how the equilibrium return strategy is affected by the reverse channel structure and found the return penalty is more significant when the products are salvaged by the player. Yan et al. [37] found the optimal pricing policies and assumed product returns and demand are random. Shang et al. [38] proposed that an increase in wardrobing is harmful to profits when the current extent of wardrobing is low and recommended charging restocking fees to prevent wardrobing. They provided new insights on pricing and refund policies to manage opportunistic behavior. Yan and Cao [39] addressed the issue of product returns under asymmetric information. The two-part price contract is designed to share the private information of online retailers, and the information is utilized by the manufacturer, who has a strong motivation to seek the contract. It is beneficial for both parties to share customer return information. Sun et al. [40] analyzed the economic lot scheduling problem and found that scheduling decreases the holding cost for returns. Sahoo et al. [10] elaborated that product returns are affected by product reviews and constructed an analytical model to examine the changes in the precision of information. They proposed that valuable reviews can effectively reduce product returns. Chen et al. [41] focused on product returns of competing retailers and how product returns impact pricing and market share in a duopoly. Taleizadeh et al. [42] developed a comprehensive model considering social and environmental aspects. Returned products are sold at a discount to increase customers' purchase intention, and the discount is related to the number of returns. Sunet al. [43] considered the problem of handling new products that are returned and selling them using mathematical modeling. They designed incentive contracts, and returns were found to be affected by a random environmental factor, which coordinated the reverse supply chain. Zhang et al. [44] considered individual refund policies after purchasing bundled products under demand uncertainty. The default product-service bundle can be returned through direct channels, consumers can unsubscribe, and the product is returned to the manufacturer.
In summary, the existing literature mainly focuses on the online and offline pricing decisions of retailers and product returns only in a single-channel context. However, from the perspective of e-retailers, product returns on the Internet as well as in physical stores have not been quantitatively studied. To bridge this gap, this article looks at the consumer demand of e-commerce in the monopoly and duopoly contexts, showing that product returns have an impact on game players' strategies both online and offline. The results are beneficial for game players in developing scientific pricing and selling strategies, which enhances economic sustainability. The related literature is summarized in Table 1 .
III. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Our article takes e-commerce as the background and explores a two-echelon supply chain system that sells two products. The supplier sells products to two retailers in a duopoly scenario and an e-retailer in a monopoly scenario. We study price strategy and channel selection under different scenarios. See Table 2 for more detailed notations and explanations.
Similar to previous research [9] , [15] , [17] , [27] , the consumer's demand function through the offline channel is given by q 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) = µa − βp 1 + γ p 2 , and the consumer's demand function through the online channel is q 2 (p 1 ,
As with previous research [2] , we assume that β > γ > 0 and unit product cost is zero. Furthermore, the information symmetry of supply chain game players is assumed in a competitive market environment. To be more consistent with actual market situations, we make the following key assumptions: m denotes the retailer's cost of handling a returned product, and θ denotes the likelihood of a product match without physical inspection. Setting the expected cost of handling a returned product as c = (1 − θ) m, then the return cost of physical stores is
We also make c > 0, p 1 > 0, p 2 > 0 and w i < p i where i = 1, 2. This means that the cost of returning a product and the online and offline prices are nonnegative. The demand and cost information are symmetrical for the supplier and retailer; both are self-interested and rational and seek profit maximization. Obviously, two sales strategies exist for both supplier and retailer. Figure 2 illustrates the models, where 2 (a) shows the case for a duopoly and 2 (b) shows the case for a monopoly. 
IV. O2O SUPPLY CHAIN DECISION MODEL IN DUOPOLY SCENARIO
In this scenario, the Stackelberg game model is considered a type of noncooperative game. The supplier and the retailers, including an online retailer and a brick-and-mortar retailer, make decisions independently, and each pursues her own profit maximization scheme [4] , [5] , [15] , [33] . Using the backward induction method, the first step, i.e., the decision problem of the retailer, is expressed as
The second step, the decision problem of the supplier, is expressed as
The profits of the supplier are given by
The profits of the brick-and-mortar retailer are given by
The profits of the online retailer are given by
The overall profits of the O2O supply chain are:
Furthermore, we can figure out the optimal pricing and summarize the important results:
Proposition 1: In a duopoly scenario, the optimal offline price p d 1 , online price p d 2 , unit wholesale price w d 1 and w d 2 are, respectively:
This indicates that the optimal offline and online prices of the retailers exist and are unique. Furthermore, we can establish the following property:
Property 1: The profits of the supplier π SD (w 1 , w 2 ) are a strictly differentiable concave function about (w 1 , w 2 ).
V. O2O SUPPLY CHAIN DECISION MODEL IN MONOPOLY SCENARIO
This scenario is regarded as a decentralized decision-making model for O2O supply chains, and the Stackelberg game model is considered a type of noncooperative game. The supplier and the e-retailer make decisions independently, and each pursues her own profit maximization scheme [4] , [5] , [15] , [33] . The e-retailer operates online and offline physical stores, and the cost of handling returns of a product is considered. We also use the backward induction method to solve the issue.
The profits of the e-retailer are given by
That is
The overall profits of the O2O supply chain are
Proposition 2: In a monopoly scenario, the optimal offline price p o 1 , online price p o 2 , unit wholesale price w o 1 and w o 2 are, respectively:
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal offline and online prices of the e-retailer exist and are unique. Furthermore, we can establish the following properties:
Property 2: The profits of the e-retailer π RO (p 1 , p 2 ) are a strictly differentiable concave function about (p 1 , p 2 ).
Property 3: Other parameters remain unchanged. With the increase of SA level, the supply chain equilibrium results are compared with the SA level as follows: The proof of Properties 2 and 3 is omitted for brevity. VOLUME 7, 2019 From Property 3, the increase in the SA level leads to an increase in offline demand and wholesale price, while the online demand and offline price decrease. However, online price and the other wholesale price (w 2 ) are not related to the SA level. This result implies that raising the SA level does not necessarily raise online and wholesale prices. The supplier can influence the e-retailer's sales strategy by adjusting sales volume and wholesale price.
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MONOPOLY AND DUOPOLY
In this section, we discuss the influence of monopoly and duopoly on the game players' decisions and financial performances. We compare the equilibrium decisions of both models to improve their performances from an economic and social perspective, according to Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3: The wholesale prices of the two products in Model D are equal to those in Model O (thus, w d
. Through observation, we find that the wholesale price does not change in the two models. The supplier is unlikely to raise wholesale prices to avoid unduly diminishing the retailer's demand. In the actual market, regardless of a monopoly or duopoly situation, it can effectively help avoid competition among suppliers. For retailers, it is conducive to maintaining good cooperation with upstream suppliers and enhancing economic sustainability.
Proposition 4: Compared to Model D, the online and offline prices of e-retailer RO are always higher in Model O, i.e., p o
where c ∈ (0, c 0 ). Strategic pricing has a direct impact on return probability, which in turn affects a retailer's business performance. Proposition 4 indicates that when the return cost meets certain conditions, online and offline prices under the monopoly situation are higher than those under the duopoly situation, which is in line with our intuition. The monopolist always operates online and offline channels to raise the selling price and thereby maximizes her own interests. The monopolist can completely control the production and supply of products so that the price can always be kept high and profits can be retained. Large-scale production not only reduces resource consumption but also reduces the cost of the products. Thus, monopolistic products reduce consumer utility, and consumers prefer to purchase products through a single channel operated by retailers to increase satisfaction. In a duopoly market, the competition between retailers is intense; both retailers offer a lower price to expand sales volume. Therefore, compared with the monopoly situation, the duopoly market is more conducive to achieving consumer satisfaction.
Proposition 5: Comparing the equilibrium profits of the supplier in Model D and Model O gives the relation: π SD > π SO , where c ∈ (0, c 1 ).
As learned from Proposition 5, a monopoly of a downstream e-retailer can cause a supplier to suffer a loss related to profitability in a supply chain. Not surprisingly, when the cost of handling returns is within a certain range, the suppliers' profits in a duopoly are higher than those in a monopoly. To understand the managerial insight behind this proposition, we explain it as follows. In Model D, the fierce competition between the downstream retailers lowers the price but increases the quantity of sales, which places the supplier in an advantageous position to wholesale more products. As demonstrated in Propositions 3 and 4, in the case of a duopoly, the online and offline prices are low, and the demand for products is higher than that in the case of a monopoly. At the same time, the wholesale price of each product is the same. Thus, the supplier enjoys greater profitability due to increased demand. Hence, the supplier benefits from such competition and thus increases its revenue in the duopoly scenario, i.e., π SD > π SO . In addition, from the point of view of a supply chain controlling the distribution channel, the supplier has the flexibility to determine the quantity of the remanufactured product in Model D compared to that in Model O (see Proposition 4) . As a result, revenues in Model D are sufficient to make up for the loss in Model O, which is the meaning of the proposition. Now we turn our attention to addressing the differences in the retailers' financial performance in both the scenarios and present the following important finding.
Proposition 6: Compared to Model D, the e-retailer's profits are always higher than the sum of the two retailers' profits in Model O, i.e., π RO > π R1 + π R2 , where c ∈ (0, c 0 ).
Proposition 6 further reveals that the products are only supplied by the monopolistic retailer, who can adjust the price and output according to her own interests and therefore have sufficient production scale and market share. The equilibrium profits of the monopolist are always higher than the sum of the profits of the duopoly retailers. We also find that Proposition 6 is consistent with Proposition 4, i.e., higher prices lead to higher monopoly profits. In addition, for supply chain members, the cost of handling returns should be kept within a reasonable range to ensure sound financial performance. One can interpret this phenomenon concerning the supplier or the buyer power as follows: A downstream monopoly can enhance the buyer power with fewer firms in a market, which hurts the upstream firms' profits according to the economic theory of a monopoly. In general, a monopoly can change the market structure, reduce the number of competitors, and effectively weaken the competition among enterprises, thus enabling enterprises to achieve economies of scale simultaneously.
Improving industrial performance to promote economic sustainability is a common goal. The industry performance of a sustainable supply chain is the driving force for maintaining the well-being of the economy. What enterprises are concerned about is how to improve economic efficiency while achieving sustainable development. Proposition 7 is elaborated on from the perspective of economic sustainability.
Proposition 7: Comparing the equilibrium profits of the O2O supply chain in Model D and Model O suggests that π O < π D , where c ∈ (0, c 8 ).
Proposition 7 indicates a comparison of supply chain profits when the cost of handling returns meets a certain range in both models. We show that the total profits of the industry (Model D) always benefit from the downstream monopoly case but are detrimental to Model O. As described in Proposition 5, as the competition of downstream retailers, which is led by monopoly, is intensive, the supplier benefits from such competition to increase its revenue, which in turn affects the supplier's sales strategy. As suppliers and retailers are the main members, their cooperative relationship increasingly influences the integration of the supply chain. In a complex business environment, close cooperation between suppliers and retailers is the best way to ensure that both sides benefit. Cooperation among supply-chain members can also alleviate the double marginal effect and achieve Pareto optimization, even if their respective profits are reduced. Consumer surplus measures the extra benefits that buyers feel they are obtaining in a particular market. When the cost of handling returns meets certain conditions, consumer surplus can be more widely obtained and brings more utility to consumers in a duopolistic market. In Model O, there is lower consumer surplus than in Model D because of the higher prices after a monopoly occurs, which is a common phenomenon in the business market. In contrast, note that the e-retailer is very concerned about a monopolistic strategy because it leads to better financial performance in Model O (Proposition 6). In general, a monopolistic strategy benefits the monopoly firm at the expense of the consumers and the partner firms. Online product reviews have become an important factor influencing consumers' purchase decisions, which could affect consumer surplus to a certain extent. Therefore, brick-and-mortar retailers need to fully consider online reviews when developing their marketing strategies. From a social perspective, increasing consumer surplus and meeting the needs of consumers to enhance their economic welfare is central to ensuring long-term economic growth.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In the analysis thus far, we have focused on the sustained impact of the marketing strategy on the economy and society from a managerial perspective. To better present how parameter changes affect sustainable performance, we conduct a numerical simulation analysis of the equilibrium decisions and the economic and social outputs for the two game models.
A. DATA SOURCES
In Section III, as with previous research [2] , we make the general assumption that β > γ > 0, so set β = 1.8, γ = 0.2. Due to the e-commerce setting, e-retailers primarily focus on the preferences of online consumers. The proportion of offline demand µ should be relatively small, so let µ = 0.3; the majority should be online consumers, thus, let the proportion of online demand 1 − µ = 0.7. To simplify the operation, set a = 100, h = 100. 
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
To test the robustness of both models, we conduct a sensitivity analysis for system parameters λ and c. The authors change VOLUME 7, 2019 First, we present the results of the equilibrium decisions in Model O. As shown in Figure 3 , as the SA level (λ) increases, the consumer demand in the offline channel increases (q o 1 ), but the demand is decreasing in the online channel (q o 2 ), which conforms to Property 3, i.e., ∂λ < 0. One can interpret this phenomenon with respect to the consumer demand as follows: Due to the increase in the offline SA level, consumers prefer to buy products in physical stores, which leads to a decrease in online shoppers.
Second, Figure 4 reports the results of the economic outcomes in the duopoly and monopoly scenarios. From  Figures 4a, b , and c, we conclude that the profits of the supplier, the retailers, and the entire system decrease with an increase in the value of c, where i = O, D. For comparison, let π RD = π R1 + π R2 . Furthermore, Figures 4a and c imply that the profitability of the supplier and the O2O supply chain in the duopoly scenario is higher than that in monopoly scenario. However, from Figure 4b , we infer that the sum of the profits of retailers 1 and 2 in Model D (π RD ) is always less than the profits of e-retailer RO in Model O (π RO ). Figures 4a, b , and c show that economic outcomes are in line with the theoretical predictions discussed in Propositions 5-7.
Finally, we focus on social sustainability in both the models. As shown in Figure 5 , the consumer surplus in Model D is larger than that in Model O (CS D > CS O ), which is consistent with Proposition 8. Furthermore, the consumer surplus in both the models decreases as the value of c increases; in other words, the higher the expected cost of handling returns is, the more disadvantageous the corresponding product is to consumers.
C. MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS
Combined with the analyses in Figures 3-5 , the implications generated through modeling and numerical analysis have key managerial insights for O2O supply chains: (1) The SA level has a remarkable influence on the market demand of online and offline channels. If retailers decide to increase sales in brick-and-mortar stores, they should invest in the SA levels to direct online consumers to the brick-and-mortar stores.
(2) Retailers' expected cost of handling a returned product is an important factor for consideration. Our analysis suggests that if a supplier is concerned about economic performance and social development, some measures must be taken to limit the monopolistic business activities related to online and offline marketing. (3) From the viewpoint of social performance, Model D is always better than Model O in terms of the consumer surplus. The distribution strategy provides a reference for decision making by enterprise managers to achieve improved performance. In brief, sustainable operations management must maintain a balance of economy and society.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The development of the Internet economy has fundamentally changed the shopping behavior of consumers. E-commerce brings some challenges to the new retailing industry, and retailers have changed their business models in response. This paper discussed product pricing and sales strategies considering product returns under the O2O business model. Well-considered sales strategies help merchants attain a competitive advantage, further optimize the allocation of social resources, and achieve Pareto improvements. The following three results are beneficial for game players in developing scientific pricing and sales strategies, which enhances their long-term economic performance.
First, the authors studied the O2O supply chain system, including a supplier who sells two products, an e-retailer or two retailers including a brick-and-mortar retailer and an online retailer, and consumers. The O2O supply chain decision models were constructed to improve performance in duopoly and monopoly scenarios. The results showed that the profits of the supplier and O2O supply chain in the duopoly context (Model D) are higher than those in a monopoly context (Model O) when the cost of handling returns for the retailer is within a certain range. Compared to Model D, as a market monopolist, the e-retailer's profits are always higher than the sum of the two retailers' profits in Model O.
Second, the cost of handling returns affects the players' profits in the duopoly and monopoly contexts. Since online products cannot be ''touched and felt'' by the consumer and due to product quality problems in offline physical stores, returns are inevitable. Consequently, determining how best to handle returns plays a key role in the profitability of both parties. Consumers can check the product and then decide whether to buy it in either a physical store or an online store to reduce the probability of returns. E-retailers must be aware of the high return probability for some products sold online. Under different return cost ranges, we compared the prices and profits of Model D and Model O to provide theoretical support for decision makers.
Last, from a social point of view, consumer surplus measures the extra benefits that buyers feel they have gained. When the retailer cost of handling returns meets certain conditions, the consumer surplus is lower in the monopoly context than in the duopoly context. From an economic sustainability perspective, the monopolist always makes more profits than retailers in a duopolistic market, and, for this reason, brick-and-mortar retailers are opening up online channels, such as JD.com, Suning.com, Wal-Mart, Uniqlo, and Metersbonwe. Supply chain participants should develop reasonable channel selection strategies to improve the benefits. Our research provides decision-making support for firms to improve operational efficiency in a dynamic external market environment.
This paper developed some valuable management methods, but there are some limitations. The linear demand function was used to construct the O2O bundling model with the hypothesis that the information between the decision makers is completely symmetrical. Moreover, demand is uncertain in the actual market, so we can consider the pricing game model with stochastic demand. This represents an important extension of this work. From an information perspective, game players retain beneficial information to maintain their economic benefit, which makes managers' access to information on demand, returns and other purchasing behaviors asymmetrical. The resulting types of equilibrium games constitute a topic worth future study.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS FOR BOTH MODELS
The online and offline prices and wholesale prices are nonnegative, i.e., p d
To facilitate analysis, we let c 0 = min(c d1 , c d2 ).
APPENDIX B All PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1: By (2) and (3), taking the derivative, we obtain dπ R1 /dp 1 = −p 1 β + p 2 γ − β (p 1 − w 1 − c + cλ) + aµ dπ R2 /dp 2 = −p 2 β −(−c + p 2 −w 2 ) β + p 1 γ + a (1 − µ) d 2 π R1 /dp 2 1 = d 2 π R2 /dp 2 2 = −2β < 0. By known conditions 0 < γ < β < 1, we see that π R1 (p 1 ) is a strictly concave function relating to p 1 and the same with π R2 (p 2 ). Let dπ R1 /dp 1 = 0, dπ R2 /dp 2 = 0, and we obtain
+2w 2 β 2 +cβγ +w 1 βγ −cβγλ−2aβµ+aγµ 4β 2 −γ 2 These two equations contain w 1 and w 2 and require further solving. By substituting p 1 , p 2 to (1) and taking the derivative of w 1 and w 2 , let us set the first derivative equal to zero to obtain the optimal solution:
By replacing these in p 1 and p 2 , we obtain the optimal solution:
In a duopoly scenario, we can replace p d 1 , p d 2 , w d 1 and w d 2 in (1), (2) and (3) to obtain the profits of supply chain members. This completes the proof.
Proof of Property 1: The second partial derivatives of w 1 and w 2 are obtained by (1), from which we obtain the Hessian Matrix:
The sequential principal minor is in turn: −4β 3
> 0, in which case the Hessian matrix is strictly negative. Therefore, π SD (w 1 , w 2 ) is a strictly concave function of (w 1 , w 2 ). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: By (6), taking the derivative, we obtain π Ro (p 1 , p 2 ), which is a strictly concave function of (p 1 , p 2 ). Let ∂π Ro /∂p 1 = 0, ∂π Ro /∂p 2 = 0, and we obtain
These two equations contain w 1 and w 2 and require further solving. Substitute p 1 and p 2 to (5), and take the derivative of w 1 and w 2 , and let us set the first derivative equal to zero to obtain the optimal solution:
Replace these in p 1 and p 2 to obtain the optimal solution:
In a monopoly scenario, replace p o 1 , p o 2 , w o 1 and w o 2 in (5), (6) and (7) to obtain the profits of supply chain members. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4: (1) If we make p o 1 > p d 1 we obtain 0 < c < c 5 , where c 5 = 2aβ 2 +aγ 2 −2aβ 2 µ+3aβγ µ−aγ 2 µ 2β 3 +β 2 γ −2βγ 2 −γ 3 −β 2 γ λ+γ 3 λ . When 0 < λ < 1, we obtain c 5 − c d1 > 0, c 5 − c d2 > 0 and then 0 < c < c 0 . In a similar way, if we make p o 1 < p d 1 , we obtain c > c 5 , and after calculation, when 0 < λ < 1, we obtain c 5 > c 0 . This has no intersection with the precondition 0 < c < c 0 , so it is omitted. Thus, only p o 1 > p d 1 holds. (2) If we make p o 2 > p d 2 , we obtain 0 < c < c 6 , where c 6 = −3aβγ −2aβ 2 µ+3aβγ µ−aγ 2 µ −2β 3 −β 2 γ +2βγ 2 +γ 3 +2β 3 λ−2βγ 2 λ . Let us make p o 2 < p d 2 , and we obtain c > c 6 . Finally, p o 2 > p d 2 is established. The proof is similar to the previous one, and we omit it.
In summary, only p o 1 > p d 1 , p o 2 > p d 2 holds. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, by setting the profit margin of the supplier as equal to 0, that is, π SD −π SO = 0, we can determine the range of the variable c. Using MATLAB R2019b, we obtain the equilibrium equation: Ac 2 +Bc+C = 0, where c > 0. Therefore, c 1,2 = −B± √ B 2 −4AC 2A . After calculation, when 0 < λ < 1, we obtain c 2 > c 1 > 0 or c 2 < 0 < c 1 . Second, when 0 < λ < 1, then 0 < c < c 0 . Furthermore, we obtain 0 < c 1 < c 0 < c 2 or c 2 < 0 < c 1 < c d2 . Through further comparison, we reach the conclusion π SD > π SO , where c ∈ (0, c 1 )
This completes the proof. Proof of Proposition 6: By setting the profit margin of the e-retailer and retailer as equal to 0, that is, π R1 +π R2 −π RO = 0, we can determine the variable c. Using MATLAB R2019b, we obtain the equilibrium equation: Dc 2 +Ec+F = 0, where c > 0. So, c 3,4 = −E± √ E 2 −4DF 2D . We find that the discriminant = E 2 − 4DF < 0. The quadratic function image f (c) = Dc 2 + Ec + F has no intersection with the horizontal axis, so there is no real root. By calculation, the quadratic term coefficient D can only be less than zero, and the image opening is downward. Therefore, when combined with the range of c, the following conclusion can be drawn: When c ∈ (0, c 0 ), then π RO > π R1 + π R2 .
From this, we obtain the conclusion for Proposition 6, where
This completes the proof. Proof of Proposition 7: By setting the profit margin of the O2O supply chain in Model D and Model O as equal to 0, that is, π O − π D = π SO + π RO − π SD − π R1 − π R2 , we set the range of the variable c. Using MATLAB R2019b, we obtain the equilibrium equation: Gc 2 + Hc + I = 0, where c > 0. So, c 7,8 = −H ± with the horizontal axis c 9 , c 10 . By calculation, the quadratic term coefficient J can only be less than zero, and the image opening is downward. Therefore, combined with the range of c, the conclusion is CS O < CS D , where c ∈ (0, c 10 ); (2) when J > 0, we obtain c 9 < 0 < c 10 < c d2 . The quadratic function image opening is upward. The conclusion is the same as above (1) .
From what has been discussed above, we obtain the conclusion for Proposition 8, where J = 32β 5 − 16β 3 γ 2 + 4βγ 4 (λ − 1)
This completes the proof.
